In this chapter, we fi rst describe how structural pricing models are different from reduced-form models and what the advantages of using structural pricing models might be. Specifi cally, we discuss how structural models are based on behavioral assumptions of consumer and fi rm behavior, and how these behavioral assumptions translate to market outcomes. Specifying the model from these fi rst principles of behavior makes these models useful for understanding the conditions under which observed market outcomes are generated. Based on the results, managers can conduct simulations to determine the optimal pricing policy should the underlying market conditions (customer tastes, competitive behavior, production costs etc.) change.
Introduction
Pricing is a critical marketing decision of a fi rm -witness this entire Handbook devoted to the topic. And increasingly, structural models of pricing are being used for understanding this important marketing decision, making them a critical element in the toolkit of researchers and managers. Starting in the early 1990s (for example see Horsky and Nelson, 1992) , there has been a steady increase in structural modeling of pricing decisions in the marketing literature. These models have accounted for fi rm and consumer decision-making processes, with topics ranging from product-line pricing, channel pricing, non-linear pricing, price discrimination and so on (see Table 6 .1 for a sample of these papers).
So what precisely are structural models of pricing? And how do they help the pricing decisions of a fi rm? In these models, researchers explicitly state the behaviors of agents based on economic or behavioral theory. In marketing, these agents are typically consumers and/or fi rms who interact in the market. Market data of quantity purchased and/ or prices and other types of promotions are treated as outcomes of these interactions. In contrast to structural models, reduced-form models do not need to articulate precisely what behaviors of consumers and/or managers lead to the observed quantity purchased and/or market prices. There is a rich tradition of such reduced-form studies in marketing, with the profi t impact of marketing strategies or PIMS studies as a leading example. In these studies, researchers examined how profi ts were affected by factors such as advertising and market concentration. Such reduced-form studies are very useful in establishing stylized facts (e.g. high fi rm concentration is associated with higher prices). Also, if the researcher's primary interest is in determining comparative statics (e.g. whether prices go up when excess capacity is more concentrated), reduced-form studies are perfectly adequate.
That said, there are several issues with these reduced-form models -the use of accounting data (which do not always capture economically relevant constructs, e.g. economic * The chapter has benefi ted from excellent comments from a referee and the editor. Draganska and Jain (2005) Optimal pricing strategies across product lines and within product lines in the yogurt industry Demand side: aggregate nested logit model with latent-class heterogeneity structure Supply side: BertrandNash pricing behavior by manufacturers and the common retailer Pricing differently across product lines but uniformly within product lines is an optimal strategy, which is consistent with current pricing practice Iyengar (2006) Increasing block pricing (three-part tariff pricing) in the wireless service industry in USA Demand side: mixed logit model Changes in access price affect consumer churn and long-term profi tability more than changes in marginal prices Changes in access prices affect the CLV of the light users more than that of the heavy users Kadiyali et al. (1996) Product line pricing in the laundry detergents market Consumers learn much faster when they are on the measured plan than when they are on the fi xed plan Pancras and Sudhir (2007) Evaluate the optimal customer, product and pricing strategy for the coupon service
Demand side: logit model with a latent-class heterogeneity structure Supply side: the retailer Catalina can increase its profi t by selling nonexclusively Catalina can increase provided by Catalina in the ketchup market sets prices to maximize category profi ts given the manufacturer's decision to buy oneto-one coupon service. The manufacturer sets wholesale price and the coupons' face value to consumers the profi t by using longer purchase history data to target Retailer will benefi t from undercutting the prices of Catalina for the one-to-one service Richards (2007) Strategic pricing promotion in perishable product market Demand side: nested logit model Supply side: multiproduct retailers maximize profi ts by making strategic decisions including shelf price, promotion price and frequency of promotion Retailers set prices and promotion strategies moderately cooperatively, which is less competitive than Bertrand Price promotions affect store revenue most when stores are highly substitutable but products are not Notes: a Bundle-size pricing means that fi rm sets prices that depend only on the number of products purchased. b Discounted component pricing means that fi rm sets component pricing and offers discounts by the total number of products purchased at the same time.
profi ts are not the same as accounting profi ts) and the reverse causality issue. As an example of the latter, estimating a simple market demand function treating fi rm prices as exogenous ignores the fact that a change of the fi rm's pricing decisions may be caused by a change in the market environment, such as competition and consumer preference. Another important issue with reduced-form models relates to Lucas's critique -the behavior of players (fi rms or consumers) is likely to be a function of the behaviors of other players. For example, if fi rms are in a price war, consumers may come to expect low prices and will change their shopping behaviors accordingly. If fi rms are able to stop this price war, how might the behaviors of consumers change as their price expectations change? These issues cannot be addressed with reduced-form models unless we have reasonable assumptions about the behaviors of consumers and/or fi rms in the market and unless we have regime-invariant estimates of consumer behavior. In contrast, using the structural approach to build pricing models, we assume that the observed market outcomes such as quantity sales and/or prices are generated from some explicit economic or behavioral theory of consumers' and fi rms' behaviors. There is an explicit linkage between theory and empirics. To build theory models of pricing (e.g. for third-degree price discrimination) that are tractable, researchers usually have to choose simple demand specifi cations and fi rm-conduct specifi cations. To understand comparative statics in such models, researchers sometimes also have to resort to selecting what might seem like arbitrary parameter values and conduct numerical simulations. An advantage of structural empirical models is that they can build realistic consumer and fi rm behavior models, and estimate them even when the models are intractable. Parameter estimates are obtained from actual data and linked to behavioral interpretations. The estimated parameters can then provide a sound basis for conducting policy simulations, such as understanding the impact of new pricing policies from existing fi rms, entry and exit, mergers and acquisitions and so on, and, based on that, provide managerial recommendations that might not be possible using the reducedform approach. This is especially true if the policy experiments are related to new price regimes, i.e. prices assumed in experiments are out of the range of the current sample data. This is because a reduced-form regression model typically tries to match the model with the observed data; there is no guarantee that the model will still perform well when new prices lie outside the range of the current data. Further, when the data are incomplete researchers can sometimes impose restrictions based on economic theory to recover the parameters they are interested in. A typical example in marketing is to infer marginal costs based on pricing equations. Thomadsen (2007) demonstrated that using a structural model, one can infer the demand and production functions in the fast-food industry solely from observed prices (and not units sold or market shares). One major constraint of structural models is the need to impose potentially restrictive behavioral assumptions. Hence they might be less fl exible compared with the reduced-form approach; researchers should examine the reasonableness of these assumptions from the data.
It is important to recognize that the distinction between a structural model of pricing and its reduced-form counterpart is less stark. That is, structural modeling is really a continuum where more details of consumer and fi rm behaviors are modeled, as data and estimation methodology permit. Most empirical models lie between 'pure' reduced-form and structural models. For example, if pricing is the real interest, researchers may focus on modeling how the behaviors of consumers are affected by the fi rm pricing strategies, or how fi rms compete in the market through pricing strategies, and treat the impact of other fi rm strategies such as advertising and non-price promotions in a reduced-form manner as simple control variables (see Chintagunta et al., 2006b ). On the other hand, we should also recognize that some sort of causal relationships are implicitly assumed in most reduced-form models, especially when the results lead to policy recommendations. Suppose a researcher estimates a simple model of price as a function of fi rm concentration, and uses the result to infer the optimal price for a fi rm. This researcher assumes that concentration changes prices and not the other way round. Further, the assumption of fi rm behavior is current period profi t or revenue maximization. When the researcher suspects that there may be a correlation between the error term and the price in the regression model, instrumental variables may be used in model estimation. However, the choice of instrumental variables implies certain assumptions about why they are correlated with prices and not the error term in the model. In summary, the major difference between structural and reduced-form models is whether behavioral assumptions are explicitly specifi ed in the model (see detailed discussion in Pakes, 2003) .
We now turn to the discussion of various parts of a structural model. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive survey of the marketing literature. We select some marketing and economic works in our discussion for illustration purposes, and refer the reader to Chintagunta et al. (2006b) , which provides a more complete survey. Our purpose here is to explain the procedure of building a structural model that relates to pricing issues in marketing, and to discuss some important but understudied issues. For greater detail, especially on econometric issues, we refer the reader to excellent surveys in Reiss and Wolak (2007) and Ackerberg et al. (2007) .
We fi rst discuss in the next section the four basic steps in constructing a structural pricing model, which involves (1) specifying model primitives including consumer preferences and/or fi rm production technologies; (2) specifying the maximands or objective functions for consumers and/or fi rms; (3) specifying model decision variables, which include consumers' quantity purchased and/or fi rms' pricing decisions. Sometimes other strategic decisions such as advertising, display promotions etc. will also be modeled. The fi nal step is (4) specifying price-setting interactions, i.e. how fi rms compete against each other through setting prices. With this structural model we explore further issues in model estimation and application, including (1) the two major types of error terms that researchers typically add in the estimation model and their implications; (2) various techniques used in the econometric estimation and other issues such as endogeneity, the choice of instruments and model identifi cation; (3) model specifi cation analysis, i.e. the test of the behavioral assumptions in the model; and (4) policy analysis based on the estimation results. We also discuss some general marketing applications of the structural model there. Finally we conclude and offer some thoughts on future research directions.
Specifying a structural pricing model
We use two papers as illustrations to show various aspects of structural modeling for setting prices. These are the studies by Besanko et al. (2003) on competitive price discrimination and Xiao et al. (2007) on pricing for wireless services in the communication industry. Competitive price discrimination cannot be grasped without an understanding of underlying consumer behaviors and fi rm strategies. Therefore Besanko et al. build a consumer choice model with the assumption of utility maximization. Further, manufacturers and retailer price decisions are modeled as the outcome of profi t maximization, with dependencies between them explicitly modeled. Besanko et al. use model estimates to conduct policy simulations, as we discuss in later sections.
Xiao et al.'s study of wireless pricing includes an analysis of three-part tariff pricing (a fi xed fee, a free usage and a marginal price that is charged with usage above the free usage) is typically used in the industry. Firms in the industry also typically offer consumers service plans that bundle several services such as voice and text message. In their data, the focal fi rm introduced a new service plan in the middle of the sample period. While most consumers fi nally choose the service plan that minimizes the total cost conditional on their observed usages, switching from one to another service plan took time. It is difficult to use a reduced-form demand model of service plans to estimate the data given the complex pricing structure and the entry of the new plan during the sample period. The authors therefore build a structural model in which consumers choose a service plan that maximizes their utility. The authors are agnostic about the fi rm pricing strategy; however, based on their estimated consumers' responses to the new service bundle under a three-part tariff they are able to explore interesting managerial issues such as whether or not bundling services in a plan under a three-part tariff will be more profi table than selling services separately under various pricing mechanisms, including linear and twopart tariff pricing. They can further compute the optimal pricing structure based on estimated consumer preference.
In anticipation of the coming discussion, Table 6 .2 lists the steps needed to build a structural model and provides a quick summary of how our two illustrative papers perform each of these steps.
Specifying model primitives
As mentioned in the introduction, the starting point of a structural model is to specify the behaviors of the agents being studied. In Besanko et al. the agents being studied are consumers, retailers and manufacturers, whereas in Xiao et al. the focus is consumer choice behavior for wireless service plans; therefore the agents studied are only consumers.
A structural model usually begins with the following model primitives: consumer preferences and fi rm production technologies. Consumer preferences are a function of variables exogenous to them, such as attributes of products, and variables that are decision outcomes of fi rms such as market prices. Firms face factor prices that are exogenous to them. A richer model usually allows for heterogeneity in the consumer preferences and/ or fi rm technologies. It is important to identify which variables in the data are assumed to be exogenous and which are not, and examine how reasonable these assumptions are. In this way we make the implied causality explicit (i.e. changes in exogenous variables cause changes in endogenous variables), and also examine how restrictive the model assumptions are. For example, it might be reasonable for researchers to assume product attributes as exogenous given a sufficiently short time horizon, but allow pricing and other promotion decisions to be endogenous, resulting from consumer preferences and the production technologies and competition behaviors of fi rms based on these primitives. Another example is that in the short run it is reasonable to treat the number of competitors as exogenous. Pricing decisions do not depend on fi xed costs. This is a common assumption used in most of the structural pricing models in marketing. However, in the long run, entry and exit can be expected to happen. Fixed costs can affect the number of competing fi rms in a market and hence also market prices.
Besanko et al. model the consumer preference for ketchup products. They allow for latent class consumer heterogeneity in brand preferences as well as responsiveness to marketing variables including price. They assume an exogenous number of manufacturers in the ketchup market and a monopoly retailer. Each manufacturer may produce several brands and must sell their products through the retailer. The marginal cost of producing one unit of the product is constant and differs across the manufacturers. The marginal cost of selling one unit of the product is the wholesale price charged by the manufacturers. They assume that other costs for the retailer are fi xed costs. Fixed costs of manufacturers and the retailer have no impact on market prices in their data. Further discussion of the details of the model is provided below.
The consumer utility in Xiao et al. is a function of the consumption of two types of services -voice and text message usages (voice and text henceforward). They assume that the preferences for the two services are continuously distributed, and these preferences might be correlated. The assumption of the preference distributions for the two services is important as they determine the fi rm's optimal bundling and non-linear pricing strategies to target different consumer segments. The fi rm decision of new service plan introduction is treated as exogenous. Because the charges for the two service plans vary according to the specifi c levels of access fee, free usages and marginal prices, the consumer cost will be different depending on the usage levels of voice and text and which service plan they sign up to. Again, further discussion of the details of the model is provided below. 
Specifying agent maximands
Next, modelers specify objective functions for agents. Objective functions can be treated as a bridge connecting the changes of exogenous variables to changes of endogenous variables that we are interested in (quantity purchased, prices etc.) Consumers are typically modeled as utility maximization agents within a time horizon. The time horizon can vary from single period to infi nite period. Firms are typically assumed to maximize profi ts, again within a single or infi nite period. They are called dynamic models if multiple periods are involved and there exists linkage between current (purchase or pricing) decisions and state variables in future periods that will affect the utility or profi t function; otherwise they are called static models. The major examples we discuss in this chapter are static models. We refer readers interested in dynamic models to another review paper by Chintagunta et al. (2006b) . We visit the dynamic issues in the conclusion section.
The assumptions of the objective functions of consumers and fi rms in Besanko et al. are common in most marketing papers on pricing strategy. On the demand side, they assume that myopic consumers maximize their utility from purchasing brand j on each shopping trip. The indirect utility for consumer i from brand j on shopping trip t, u ijt is given by
where g ij is consumer i's brand preference, a i is consumer i's sensitivity to price p jt . The parameter b i measures consumer i's responsiveness to other marketing variables x jt such as feature and display. The indirect utility for the outside option is normalized to be mean zero with a random component e i0t . The myopic consumer assumption may be reasonable for ketchup, given that it is a small-price item in the shopping basket. A latent-class structure is used to capture consumer heterogeneity: there are K latent-class consumer segments, and every segment has its own parameters (g
) and a probability weight l k , k 5 1,. . .,K. On the supply side, the manufacturer is assumed to maximize her current period profi t by charging wholesale prices for her products, given other manufacturers' pricing strategies and the expected retailer's reaction to wholesale prices. The monopoly retailer is assumed to maximize her profi t conditional on manufacturers' wholesale prices. The monopoly retailer r's objective function is modeled as follows:
The manufacturer m's objective function is the following:
where p j is the retail price for brand j, w j is the wholesale price, mc j is the marginal cost, l k is the size of segment k, S k j is the share for brand j within segment k, and B m is the number of brands offered by manufacturer m with g m B m 5 J. Finally, M is the quantity of total potential demand in the local market.
In Xiao et al., consumers are assumed to choose a service plan at the beginning of each period to maximize the expected utility within the period (rather than maximize intertemporal utility). If consumer i chooses a service plan j, j 5 1, . . ., J, from the focal fi rm at time t, she will then choose the number of voice minutes x V it , the number of text messages 
where d j is a plan-specifi c preference intercept. u L it is the preference parameter of consuming service L, L 5 {V, D}, with the following specifi cation:
where u 
are the price sensitivity parameters for voice and text, respectively. The consumer will maximize the above direct utility function subject to the budget constraint:
where Y i is the income of the consumer, and { ? } is an indicator function that equals one if the logical expression inside is true, and zero otherwise. The variable d it is the consumer's choice at time t. Solving this constrained utility maximization problem, Xiao et al. obtain the consumer's optimal usage decision x L* it as follows:
The consumer's optimal usage is a non-linear function depending on which interval her u L it is in. Plugging equation (6.7) into the direct utility function (6.4), the authors obtain consumer i's indirect utility V j, it from choosing the service plan j.
The above examples assume fully rational consumers and fi rms. Recently there has
Structural models of pricing 119 been a call in marketing to incorporate psychological and sociological theories into modeling consumers' and fi rms' behaviors, e.g. including reference dependence, fairness, confi rmatory bias (see Narasimhan et al., 2005) . Such richer specifi cations will help to explain the observed data which may not be explained by standard economic theory -for example, market response to price increases versus decreases may be asymmetric. This may relate to reference dependence or other psychological factors.
On the fi rm behavior modeling front too, researchers have increasingly explored fi rms going beyond pure profi t maximization. Chan et al. (2007) fi nd that the manager of an art-performance theater has a larger preference weight for avant-garde shows, which is consistent with the center's mission statement. Sriram and Kadiyali (2006) study if retailers and manufacturers maximize a weighted combination of shares or sales and profi ts, and what impact this maximand and behavior have on price setting. They fi nd that across three categories, there is evidence that these fi rms maximize more than pure profi ts; as expected, fi rms that care about sales or shares price lower and fi rms that have higher prices place a negative weight on sales or shares. Wang et al. (2006) model fi rm managers' objective function as a linear combination of expected profi ts and shareholder market value, and their empirical evidence supports this assumption. All three studies point to an issue with static supply-side models, i.e. the difficulty of capturing accurately in a static supply-side model the complexities of competitive pricing in a dynamic game. For example, fi rms can have long-run objectives that might be a combination of shares, profi ts, shareholder market value etc. In the short run, the fi rm might consider building market share and sacrifi cing profi tability to do so, with the goal of market dominance and profi tability in the longer run. Also, multiple forms of fi rm behavior are possible in dynamic games, e.g. entry deterrence, predatory pricing, etc. that are hard to capture in a simple static one-shot game.
Another important assumption in most structural pricing studies that deserves attention is the role of uncertainty or information set of both fi rms and consumers. The typical assumption has been that consumers know their preferences as well as fi rm prices, fi rms know the (distribution of) consumer preferences and their own and rivals' pricing strategies. For example, Besanko et al. (2003) assume that consumers know their own brand preferences and the prices charged by retailers, while fi rms have good knowledge about the underlying segment structure of consumer preferences (the discrete preference types). It seems a reasonable assumption for stable product markets in their paper. However, this assumption might be unrealistic in many instances. Consumers might be unaware of their own preferences given limited information. For example, Xiao et al. (2007) consider two types of consumer uncertainty: fi rst, consumers do not know the usage shock j L it (see equation (6.5)) when they decide which service plan to choose at the beginning of each period. Second, consumers may not know their mean preference types u i ; instead, they have to learn their preference over time by observing their usage experience. This behavior assumption is consistent with the fact in the data that consumers only switched to the new data-centric plan several periods after the plan had been introduced (some did not switch even at the end of the sample period) even when their benefi ts would be large had they switched earlier.
Consumers also may not have perfect information on attributes or quality and prices of all products available in the market. Firms might not know the precise distribution of consumer preferences, and might have incomplete knowledge of their own or rivals' production technologies and pricing strategies. Some structural pricing papers have attempted to incorporate these alternative information set assumptions. Miravete (2002) provides empirical evidence of a signifi cant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under different tariff pricing schemes in the telecommunication industry. We expect future pricing research to study the impact of limited information on either consumers' or fi rms' decision-making; the results from these studies are likely to be different from those from models with a perfect information assumption.
Specifying model decision variables
Given that this chapter is about structural models of pricing, price is of course the fi rm decision variable that we are focusing on. However, there are at least two layers of complexity in studying pricing -the depth in which pricing is studied, and whether other decision variables are studied simultaneously.
Several studies have examined the case of fi rms choosing a single price for each product. In Besanko et al. (2003) , each manufacturer chooses one wholesale price for each of her own brands. The monopolist retailer decides the retail price for each brand conditional on the wholesale price. While modeling each fi rm as picking one price is an appropriate place for structural pricing studies to begin their inquiry, researchers must acknowledge that a more complicated pricing structure exists in most industries. Firms may optimize prices of product lines and for various customer segments. Similarly, pricing can be either linear, fi xed fee, or a more complicated non-linear scheme. An increasing number of studies examines the issue of price discrimination (e.g. Verboven, 2002; Besanko et al., 2003; Miravete and Roller, 2003; Leslie, 2004; McManus, 2004) . Further, pricing for multiple products (product line) leads to the possibility of bundling and charging different prices for different product bundles (e.g. Chu et al., 2006) . Under these pricing schemes closedform optimal solutions usually do not exist, and computational complexity has deterred research efforts in the past. However, with recent development in computation and econometric techniques, researchers are able to estimate complicated models. For instance, Xiao et al. (2007) used simulation-based methods to estimate the demand function for voice and text under service bundling with three-part tariffs. Based on these results they further compute the optimal pricing strategy for the fi rm under various scenarios.
The other issue in building structural models of price is whether price can be studied independently of other strategic choices of fi rms. Examples include the study of joint determination of price and advertising (Kadiyali, 1996) and study of the relationship between price and channel choice (Chen et al., 2008; Chu et al., 2007) . Often, researchers are constrained by data and the complexity of modeling to examine such joint determination. An additional tricky issue is the possible difference in the periodicity of decision-making regarding price decisions versus other decisions, such as advertising or production capacity. If these decisions are made in different planning cycles, e.g. pricing being made weekly and advertising quarterly, it is difficult to estimate jointly optimal price and advertising rules with a different number of data points. Typically, researchers have assumed the same periodicity of such decisions (e.g. Vilcassim et al., 1999) . Another alternative used is to examine the issue sequentially, e.g. studying the choice of price conditional on previous locational choice made by the fi rm when it entered the market (Venkataraman and Kadiyali, 2005) . In this case the fi rst-stage locational choice will take account of its impact on pricing in future periods, leading to a more complicated dynamic model setting.
Modeling price-setting interactions
Given assumptions about consumers and fi rms maximizing their objectives, how does the market equilibrium evolve and how do these decision-makers interact with one another? The typical assumption about consumer behavior has been price-taking. For fi rms, the default has been to assume one form of behavior such as Bertrand-Nash, Stackelberg leader-follower or collusive pricing game. An important point to bear in mind when imposing a particular assumption of how fi rms interact with each other is to justify why this is an appropriate assumption for the industry, given that the estimation results are very dependent on the assumption made. For example, Besanko et al. (2003) assume a manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game on the supply side. On this assumption, the retailer chooses retail prices to maximize the objective function (equation 6.2) by taking the wholesale prices as given. The fi rst-order condition for the retailer's objective function is
Manufacturers decide the wholesale prices to maximize the objective function (equation 6.3) by taking into account the retailer's response to wholesale prices, i.e. 'p l /'w j , j, l 5 1, . . ., J. The fi rst-order condition for a manufacturer with respect to a brand jr is
where g j r j is equal to one if brand j and jr are offered by the same manufacturer; otherwise it is equal to zero, and l k is the size of segment k, k 5 1, . . ., K. As we discuss later, Besanko et al. demonstrate that the MS game is a reasonable assumption in their data. The manufacturers are selling in the national market, hence they are likely to be leaders in the vertical channel, while the retailer sells in a local market, so she is likely to be a follower. Further, the retailer sells for all manufacturers, so is assumed to maximize category profi ts. The monopolist retailer assumption is consistent with the conventional retailer wisdom that most consumers do grocery shopping at the same store.
An alternative to imposing an assumption of how fi rms interact with each other is to compare various alternative assumptions and let the data suggest which model best represents market outcomes. Gasmi et al. (1992) and Kadiyali (1996) are two of the few studies considering a menu of models (forms) and choosing the one that fi ts the data best. Gasmi et al. (1992) consider different fi rm conduct behaviors such as Nash in prices and advertising, Nash in prices and collusion in advertising, Stackelberg leader in price and advertising etc. when they analyze the soft-drink market using data on CocaCola and Pepsi-Cola from 1968 to 1986. Using a similar approach, Kadiyali (1996) analyzes pricing and advertising competition in the US photographic fi lm industry.
Estimating and testing a pricing structural model

Going from deterministic model to market outcomes
Outcomes from the economic models of utility and profi t maximization are deterministic. In reality, given any parameter set these outcomes will not perfectly match with the observed prices and quantity purchased in the data. To justify these deviations, and hence to construct an econometric model that can be estimated from the data, researchers have typically added two types of errors: errors that capture agent's uncertainty and errors that capture researcher's uncertainty. The agent's uncertainty is when either consumers or fi rms (retailers and manufacturers) have incomplete information about marketplace variables that infl uence their objective functions. Researchers may or may not observe such an error term from their data. For example, before visiting a store consumers might know only the distribution of prices and not the exact prices in the store. The researcher's uncertainty stems from researchers not observing from the data some important variables that affect consumers' or fi rms' objective functions, but consumers and fi rms observe these variables and account for them in their optimization behavior. An example of such uncertainty is that shelf-space location of items inside a store may affect consumers' purchase decisions but researchers cannot observe shelf-space locations in the data. Such errors become the stochastic components in the structural models which help researchers to rationalize the deviations of predicted outcomes from their models from observed market data. Economic and managerial implications can be very different under these two error assumptions and, depending on the problem, justifying the distributional assumptions of these errors can be critical, as we discuss below.
In their paper, Besanko et al. (2003) assume researcher's uncertainty only and capture it in two kinds of error terms. One is e ijt in equation (6.1), which is consumer i's idiosyncratic utility for different product alternatives. This is to capture the factors that affect consumers' purchase decision but are unknown to researchers. Besanko et al. follow the standard assumption that e ijt is double exponentially distributed. Relying on this distribution assumption, the authors can obtain the probability of type k consumer purchasing brand j(S k jt ) as follows:
Another error term takes account of the product attributes (e.g. coupon availability, national advertising etc.) observed by the consumers but not by the researchers. It is represented by j jt in equation (6.1). There is no agent's uncertainty in their modelconsumers know own e ijt and j jt , while fi rms know j jt for all brands and the distribution of e ijt . The existence of j jt causes the endogeneity bias in estimation -since fi rms may take into account its impact on market demand when they make price decisions, it will lead to the potential correlation between fi rms' prices and j jt in consumers' utility function. Ignoring this price endogenity issue in the estimation will lead to biased estimation results and further biased inferences. See Chintagunta et al. (2006a) for a detailed analysis of this issue. We further discuss how to solve this issue in later sections. Xiao et al. (2007) include both researcher's uncertainty and agent's uncertainty in their econometric model. One is e ijt in equation (6.4), which captures the researcher's uncertainty of factors that may affect the consumer's choice of service plan but are unobserved by researchers. Similar to Besanko et al. (2003) , e ijt is assumed to follow the double exponential distribution. Another error term is j L it in equation (6.5), which is consumer i's time-varying preference shock of using service L, L 5 V, D. The exact value is assumed to be unknown to the consumer when she makes the service plan choice, and hence captures the agent's uncertainty. The consumer may also have uncertainty about her mean prefer-
Hence, with uncertainties of u i and j L it the consumer has to form an expectation for her indirect utility function V j,it conditional on her information set V it , which consists of her past usage experience, i.e. E[V j,it 0 V it ]. The consumer will choose the alternative with the highest expected indirect utility. For simplicity let us assume that there is no switching cost. Under the distribution assumption of e ijt we can write down the probability of consumer i choosing plan j as
Note the difference between (6.10) and (6.11). In Besanko et al.'s (2003) set-up there is no agent's uncertainty, i.e. fi rms know j jt for sure; hence they do not need to form an expectation for (g ij 1 x jt b i 2 a i p jt 1 j jt ). 2 In Xiao et al. (2007) , because of the agent's uncertainty each consumer has to form a conditional expectation for V j,it when she makes the service plan choice. In contrast, when deciding how much voice and text to be used during the period, u it (see equation (6.5)) is fully revealed to the consumer. Hence there is no agent's uncertainty in the usage decisions (see equation (6.7)). The authors assume that the fi rm knows only the distribution of u i for all consumers and not for each individual consumer, the researchers' information on u i is exactly the same as the fi rm's. Further, any potential unobserved product attributes of the service plans in the data have been accounted for by the plan preference parameter d j in the utility function (this effect is assumed as fi xed over time; see equation (6.4)). Hence there is no price endogeneity issue in estimating the market share function of service plans. However, if there is an aggregate demand shock (say, a sudden change in the trend of using text message among cellular users) observed by the fi rm but not by researchers, the pricing structure of the new data-centric plan can be correlated with such a shock, and the endogeneity issue will then arise. Reiss and Wolak (2007) identify other sources of error terms that could be considered in future research. In general, it is fair to say that the treatment of the nature and source of errors has not received the attention that it merits.
Econometric estimation
Depending on the type of errors in the model, various econometric techniques have been used in model estimation. Simple OLS or the likelihood approach is widely used when the endogeneity issue does not arise. Structural models typically involve the estimation of simultaneous equation systems. For example, in Besanko et al. (2003) the model involves consumer choice, manufacturers' and the retailer's pricing decisions. In Xiao et al. (2007) the model involves both service plan choice and usage decisions. FIML (full information maximum likelihood) or method of moments has been widely used for estimating simultaneous equations. Advanced simulation-based techniques have been developed recently (e.g. see Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996) in model estimation when there is no closedform expression of the fi rst-order conditions or likelihood functions. For example, Xiao et al. (2007) fi nd that there is no closed-form expression for the plan choice probability function (see equation (6.11)) when there are agent's uncertainty of own u i and preference shocks j it . In the model estimation, therefore, they use the simulation approach to integrate out the distribution of u i (according to consumers' beliefs) and j it to evaluate the probability prob i (j). In general, allowing for a richer type of errors in the model will complicate the computation of the likelihood of observed market outcomes, and in such situations researchers have to rely on simulation methods. Instead of the classical likelihood approach, marketing researchers have often used the Bayesian approach in model estimation, especially when they want to model a fl exible distribution of consumer heterogeneity.
A thorny issue relates to the endogeneity or simultaneity problem when the error terms correlate with prices. In empirical input-output (IO) literature, such as in Berry (1994) , Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) , generalized method of moments (GMM) and simulated method of moments estimators are usually used. Various advanced methods including contraction mapping and simulation-based estimation have been developed. The general principle is to use instruments for the endogenous variable price in model estimation. An advantage of using instruments in GMM is that researchers do not need to specify a priori the joint distribution of the error terms (e.g. j jt in Besanko et al., 2003) and the endogenous variable such as price in their model. Recently, there has been a revival in likelihood-based estimates with the rise of Bayesian estimation in tackling the simultaneity issue (Yang et al., 2003) . Another issue relates to the existence of multiple equilibria in the model (this is especially true for many dynamic competition models), where the likelihood function is not well defi ned. GMM in this case is useful for model estimation since it only uses the optimality condition in any of the equilibria but remains agnostic about which equilibrium is chosen by the markets in data. See related discussion in Ackerberg et al. (2007) .
The role of instruments is very important in the econometric estimation of structural pricing models. The requirements for a good instrumental variable are 'relevance', i.e. the variable has to be correlated with the endogenous variable such as price; and 'exogen eity', i.e. the variable has to be uncorrelated with the unobserved error term. If relevance is low, researchers will have weak instruments and the error in the estimation can be large. Without exogeneity the instruments are invalid and researchers will obtain inconsistent estimates. Hence researchers have to examine the quality of the instruments they choose according to these aspects. Because structural models explicitly specify how the data are generated based on behavioral assumptions and hence how error terms and decision variables such as price are potentially correlated in the model, it helps us to understand to what extent the chosen instruments are valid. For example, if fi rms are involved in Bertrand-Nash pricing competition and their objective is to maximize own profi t, cost shifters will be relevant and valid instruments for price in the demand equation (Berry et al., 1995) . Bresnahan et al. (1997) specify the 'principles of differentiation' instruments, including counts and means of competing products produced by the same manufacturer and by different manufacturers, for price. They argue that their instruments will be valid under different types of non-cooperative games such as Bertrand and Cournot. Lagged prices are sometimes used as instruments for current prices if the error term is independent over time (e.g. see Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999) .
The availability of good instruments is closely related to the identifi cation issue in the model. Usually there are several important behavioral parameters that researchers are interested to estimate, and the others in the model are termed 'nuisance' parameters. Unless there is enough variation in data, the behavioral parameters may not be identifiable. For example, price coefficients in a structural model with both demand and supply functions may not be identifi ed if there is no variation in cost variables (e.g. raw materials cost) across markets or across time periods. Identifi cation is not simply a matter of statistical identifi cation of ensuring exclusion restrictions or overidentifi cation restrictions, but rather more of determining the underlying movement in various market drivers that enables identifi cation. A classic example of such identifi cation is Porter (1983) . In a study of rail cartels that ship grain, Porter uses the exogenous shift in demand caused by whether lake steamers were in operation or not -if lakes were frozen, this substitute was not available and therefore rail shipment demand increased predictably. This exogenous shift in demand is easily observed by the cartel members. Therefore, when demand falls with the lake steamers operating, cartel members should not misinterpret the drop in their demand as stemming from another cartel member stealing customers by offering better prices secretly. Therefore this exogenous demand shift is an important instrument in inferring whether pricing is collusive or not. This example illustrates both the importance of fi nding exogenous demand or cost shifters, and using them in theoretically grounded ways to help identify the pricing strategy of fi rms rather than a simple statistical identifi cation strategy.
Because of the potential correlation between price and j jt , Besanko et al. (2003) would not be able to identify the price coefficient a i unless they had good instruments for price (see equation (6.1)). They choose product characteristics and factor costs as instruments for prices, and use the GMM to estimate their model. They demonstrate the importance of taking account of the price endogeneity issue by estimating the model without considering it. They fi nd that the price coefficient will be downward-biased in the latter case. Xiao et al. (2007) face a data problem in identifying the price sensitivity parameters b . Then they use the fact that some consumers switch service plans during the sample period. Since the two service plans have different pricing structures, by switching plans these consumers face different marginal prices for voice and text in data. The change of usage levels, once above the free usage levels, of the same consumer will help to infer consumer sensitivity to price changes.
The restriction on agents' objective functions is sometimes necessary for model identifi cation. Suppose one wants to allow for a richer specifi cation with non-profi t maximization objectives and other biases in the fi rm pricing decision, such a model may not be identifi ed solely from the data of market prices and quantity demanded. Similarly a consumer choice model allowing for consumers' imperfect information or bounded rationality may not be identifi able from traditional scanner data. In this case one may need to use other data sources such as self-reported consumers' expectation of future prices or fi rms' expectation of future profi ts or revenues (e.g. see Chan et al., 2007a and Horsky et al., 2007) .
3 Alternatively, creative fi eld experiments in which price variations are exogenously designed (e.g. see Drèze et al., 1994 and Simester, 2004) can help to avoid the endogeneity issue. In these cases researchers are certain that observed prices are not affected by aggregate demand shocks; hence consumers' price sensitivity (short-or longterm) can be estimated without resorting to the structural approach.
Specifi cation analysis
Related to the above discussion, specifi cations and hence the estimation results are very dependent on the behavioral assumptions made in the model. While some assumptions have to be made to build structure (e.g. the market demand functional form and the distribution assumption of unobserved errors), when researchers use the reduced-form approach they rely less on the specifi cation of the behavioral assumptions; hence their models may be more fl exible to fi t with the data. Most studies using the structural approach have not shown too much due diligence in comparing alternative behavioral assumptions or justifying from managerial or other sources why their assumptions are justifi ed. In this regard, some issues to keep in mind are mentioned below.
First, model fi t should not be the only criterion in determining whether or not the model assumptions are reasonable. Indeed, if model fi t is the only criterion, researchers will often fi nd that reduced-form models dominate structural models whose functional specifi cation relies heavily on restrictive behavioral assumptions. The objective of a structural pricing model should not always be to minimize statistical error but to minimize model assumption error. The former refers to the objective of fi nding the best fi t with the data. The latter refers to identifying a set of economic and behavioral theories that makes sense in explaining the data-generating process. As mentioned in previous sections, some questions related to behavioral assumptions are: are fi rms competitive or colluding with each other? Are consumers or fi rms maximizing long-term profi t or value functions? Is there asymmetric information between fi rms and consumers? Does learning better capture fi rm and consumer behavior than the assumption of perfect information? Are there some 'irrational' behaviors that can be explained by psychological or sociology theory? In deciding which assumption to choose, researchers might have to make a tradeoff in choosing a model that describes the market more reasonably, even if this might mean sacrifi cing the model fi t. For example, Besanko et al. (2003) model the interactions between manufacturers and the retailer in the channel where manufacturers are Stackleberg price leaders. Even if the authors found that a model assuming the retailer as the Stackleberg price leader over national manufacturers fi ts better with the price data, they might not want to use such a specifi cation, considering the market reality.
So if model fi t is not always the best means to judge the performance of a pricing structural model, what is? An important test is whether the model assumptions lead to sensible results when we go from model assumptions to managerial recommendations. For example, Besanko et al. (2003) compared the equilibrium outcome under their specifi cation with different alternative assumptions. The implied retail margins from their model are face valid and therefore support the feasibility of the manufacturer Stackelberg leader assumption. In another example Xiao et al. (2007) fi nd that with consumer learning and switching cost in their model, they can explain why some consumers switch to the new service plan while the others do not. Another way to see whether results are sensible is to conduct policy simulations and see if those results are sensible. We discuss more on this below.
Policy analysis
As discussed above, by building the structural model to analyze the underlying consumer preferences and fi rms' pricing decisions, we can use the structural analyses to answer some questions which cannot be addressed by reduced-form analysis precisely. Specifi cally, the results of a structural model can be used to conduct managerially useful simulation exercises. These exercises are valuable because the assumed policies can be out of sample (prices set at a level away from the sample observations, change in the mode of interactions between fi rms and consumers, entry and exit in the market, new government restrictions, and hypothetical consumer preference structure etc.) and will not be subject to the Lucas critique. Besanko et al. (2003) assume that the retailer sets a uniform price in the model. Based on their demand and supply system estimates, they simulate the effects of two kinds of thirddegree price discrimination, which are initiated by either the retailer or manufacturers. Retailer-initiated price discrimination means that the retailer sets segment-specifi c prices to maximize her profi ts. Manufacturer-initiated price discrimination means that manufacturers induce the retailer to charge segment-specifi c prices by offering her scanback discounts. The policy experiments show that fi rms can increase profi t by discriminating a fi nite number of customer segments under both cases. So in this empirical analysis, price discrimination under competition does not lead to all-out competition (i.e. prices lower than uniform pricing strategy). Allowing for both vertical product differentiation and horizontal differentiation, they fi nd empirical evidence that is against the theoretical fi nding that price discrimination under competition will lead to the prisoner's dilemma. This provides important managerial insights. Xiao et al. (2007) illustrate how the fi rm may use its estimation result of the consumer preferences for voice and text to better segment the market. In particular, they fi nd that preferences for voice and text are weakly positively correlated, indicating that a consumer with high preference for voice is more likely to have high preference for text. Based on their results they calculate the market response to changes in the three-part tariff structure, i.e. access fee, free usages and marginal prices. Finally they compute the optimal pricing structure for the two service plans, and predict the types of consumers, in terms of preferences for voice and text, that each service plan will be able to attract. They further compare the result with the predicted profi ts when the fi rm charges a two-part tariff under the bundling case, and when the fi rm charges two-and three-part tariffs but without bundling the two services. They fi nd that a computed optimal three-part tariff under bundling generates about 38 percent higher revenue than at the current prices, although expected market share is 10 percent lower. Compared with the optimal prices without bundling, the three-part tariff will generate about 8 percent higher revenue. The impact on consumer welfare may vary depending on the consumer segments.
More examples covering different aspects of policy simulations relating to pricing can be found. For example, in addition to Xiao et al. above, Leslie (2004) , Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Iyengar (2006) consider non-linear pricing. Draganska and Jain (2005) study the optimal pricing strategies across and within product lines in the yogurt industry. A similar analysis of product-line pricing and assortment decisions is in Draganska et al. (2007) . Two papers that cover policy analyses with channel changes are Chen et al. (2008) and Chu et al. (2006) . As all these examples indicate, policy analyses form the core of the managerially useful output of structural pricing studies.
Summary
Structural models of pricing can be useful in understanding the consumer-and fi rm-based drivers of market prices. They can also be useful in generating robust and managerially useful implications. That said, given the criticality of behavioral assumptions and instrumental variables in structural price models, researchers need to justify the use of these with great care. More careful analysis of the issues of model comparison and model identifi cation by checking with the data will also be very useful. Yet another area in which structural models can be improved is the modeling of behavioral issues in pricing, relating to both consumers and fi rms. This is becoming more important following the call to incorporate psychological and sociological theory to better explain the consumer and fi rm behaviors. Narasimhan et al. (2005) discuss how, despite the demonstration of a variety of behavioral anomalies, very few theoretical models have attempted to incorporate these in their formulation. The same is true of structural pricing work. An exception is Conlin et al. (2007) , who show that people are over-infl uenced by the weather on the day that they make their clothing purchases (rather than accurately forecasting the weather for the days of actual usage of the clothing item).
One way to allow for modeling behavioral issues is to enrich data sources. Additional data may be necessary for researchers to identify a richer set of behavioral assumptions from the data. For example, if we want to model how fi rms form expectations about their rivals' pricing strategy, we might need to supplement market data with surveys. An example of such a study is Chan et al. (2007a) , who use the managerial self-reported expectations of ticket sales and advertising expenditures to understand the bias and uncertainty of managers when they make advertising decisions. Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) use lab experiment data to test if rational economic theories can explain economic outcomes in auction markets. If such data are difficult to obtain, researchers need, at the least, to acknowledge how the behavioral assumptions in their structural models can be tested with additional data. This summary would be incomplete without consideration of alternatives to structural models of pricing. Reduced-form methods might be useful in providing stylized facts about pricing and other market outcomes. For example, Kadiyali et al. (2007) fi nd that in real-estate deals where the buyer's agent and the seller's agent work for the same company, list prices are strategically set higher (and result in higher sales prices). A full model of buyer and seller dynamics, including the role for buyer and seller agents, accounting for endogenous entries and exits is beyond current methodologies. However, it is still useful to establish these stylized facts because they might reveal market inefficiencies that are important to both buyers and sellers and antitrust authorities. Similarly, natural experiments-based reduced-form models, e.g. Ailawadi et al.'s (2001) research on P&G's switch to EDLP (everyday low pricing), offer very interesting avenues for understanding markets when full models are hard to build. For other marketing applications also see Drèze et al. (1994) and Anderson and Simester (2004) . We expect that, in the future, marketing researchers will spend more effort in data collection though various sources such as survey and lab or natural experiments, and use these additional data to identify a richer set of behavioral assumptions in their models.
Interesting managerial implications may be generated from dynamically modeling the consumer choice and fi rm pricing behavior. Some of the marketing applications of dynamic models, such as Erdem et al. (2003) , Sun (2005) , Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Chan et al. (2007b) , study how consumers' price expectations change their purchase and inventory-holding behaviors. In the dynamic competition games among fi rms, the equilibrium concept is typically Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; that is, agents maximize an objective function, taking into account other agents' behavior and the effect of their current decisions on future state variables (e.g. market share, brand equity and productivity). A wide variety of strategies may be adopted, and some of the equilibrium outcomes are very difficult to model or compute. There has not been much empirical application in the literature due to these issues. However, with the recent development of computation and econometric techniques we start to see growing interest in academic research. For example, Nair (2007) studies the skimming strategies for video games, and Che et al. (2007) study pricing competition when consumer demand is state-dependent (e.g. switching cost, inertia or variety-seeking in consumer behavior) in the breakfast cereal market. These authors have made some interesting fi ndings that would not have emerged from the static models. Studying the interactions of policies with a short-term impact on profi tability such as price promotion and others with a long-term impact such as location and R&D investment decisions under the dynamic framework is another important area for future research. Finally, due to the computation complexity researchers might have to make some reduced-form assumptions in their models (e.g. reduced-form price expectation or demand function), and focus on the structural aspect of the strategic behaviors such as strategic inventory-holding among households or entry and exit decisions of fi rms. As a result the difference between the structural and the reduced-form approach is even less stark, as we discussed in the introduction.
